Thailand is "juiocracy" backed by the military

An article by Thitinan Pongsudhirak entitled "Thailand's Misrule by Law" was published today in the WSJ:

 The red shirts movement, initially pro-Thaksin but increasingly beyond Mr. Thaksin's control, is likely to be further galvanized. Rallies around the country now regularly attract tens of thousands of red-shirt demonstrators. Their claims of injustice and "double standards" will intensify, and their anti-status quo resolve will harden.

Supporters of the post-coup status quo are preparing for a return to democracy, but with the playing field tilted in their favor.  Following the Democrats' fraud dismissals, military authorities have hinted they will soon lift the state of emergency in the Bangkok metropolitan area. This would prepare the way for the Democrat-led coalition government to call elections in 2011.

The establishment forces' game plan is clear. Having put down Mr. Thaksin's challenge and crushed the red shirts' uprisings in April 2009 and earlier this year, the latter at a cost of 91 fatalities and 1,900 injuries, the army-backed government of Abhisit Vejjajiva is emboldened to soldier on with its own populist agenda of deficit spending on handouts and giveaways in preparation for the polls.

The Democrats are unlikely to win an outright victory, but the establishment camp can ensure they remain in power. The army is poised to pressure smaller parties to join a Democrat-led coalition, leaving out the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party. 

But using the military's power to thwart the results of elections in this way will likely inspire a new outburst from the red shirts. Fragmented both in terms of organization and ideology, these activists are united only by their opposition to the redistribution of power after the coup. Their lack of a common set of objectives, in turn, feeds the paranoia of the establishment, setting up a series of confrontations down the road. 

The article is mostly about the role of the courts in changing governments.   But the key player on the eve of a national election, Thitinan suggests, is the military.   That's why I was disappointed that Thitinan does not spell-out how he expected the army to pressure the smaller parties during the run-up to the next election (surely not at gunpoint!).   Some discussion as to the specific means by which the army can be expected to achieve a political ends without using force would have made for a more compelling analysis.  The army can certainly make a show of force, but it's not clear what else it can accomplish (if the aftermath of the 2006 coup is any indication, not much).  Perhaps more than its fire power, the political ineptitude, and to some extent, the apparent disunity of the army, has been a factor in Thai politics.

Thitinan concludes:

In the protracted face-off between the establishment, fronted by Mr. Abhisit and reinforced by the judiciary, bureaucracy and army, a compromise involving reform of the way power is wielded is the only way forward. But the government and its powerful backers seem determined to prevail at all cost. They are risking an even bigger upheaval that threatens Thailand's survival as a unified state.

Other scenarios?  For example, change at the top of Thai society could lead to a fragmentation of the elite, altering the post-war political dynamic.  Certainly, change is coming.  Depending on how events unfold, a decisive shifting of alliances within the elite might be expected.   It's not a stretch to imagine that elements associated with today's opposition movement could find themselves positioned as the new power-brokers.

In other words,  the unity of the two contending political forces in Thai society is not eternal.   One  side or the other -- possibly both -- could shatter at any time.